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SECOND AMENDMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL
DYSFUNCTION OR NECESSARY SAFEGUARD?
ROBERT J. COTTROL∗

When Jim Fleming asked me to participate in this Symposium, and more
specifically to be part of the Second Amendment panel, I must confess that I
was a bit puzzled. There are many parts of our political and constitutional
system that are arguably dysfunctional, meaning that our late–eighteenth
century Constitution prevents the achievement of policy results that are
desirable in our early-twenty-first century present. I do not see, however, the
Second Amendment as one of those constitutional features. As a result, this
Essay challenges two assumptions: first, that the Second Amendment
historically has provided much of a barrier to a desirable policy result, radical
gun control or perhaps more accurately gun prohibition; and second, that such
a result is indeed desirable.
For the first proposition, it is fair to say that until the 2008 case of District of
Columbia v. Heller1 and its 2010 companion McDonald v. City of Chicago,2
the federal courts had been essentially absent from the business of looking at
the Second Amendment and seriously asking what protection it provides, as
well as what limitations it places on individuals’ rights to have arms. This was
not, as some have erroneously insisted, because there was some universal
agreement that the Amendment, which speaks of a well-regulated militia and
the right of the people to keep and bear arms, applied only to militias and not
to individuals in their private capacities. Before Heller, the Supreme Court had
recognized the individual nature of the right to arms on those rare occasions
when it had referenced this right or the right to have arms generally – including
∗

Robert J. Cottrol, Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law and Professor of
History and Sociology, The George Washington University. This Essay was delivered at the
Symposium titled America’s Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes, and
Cures, at Boston University on November 15-16, 2013. The Author would like to
acknowledge the research assistance of The George Washington University Law School
students Rebecca Szucs, Benjamin Anders, and Shawn Greene. I would also like to thank
Bob Dowlut, Ray Diamond, and Nick Johnson for reading drafts of this Essay and making
helpful suggestions. It should be noted that the style of this Essay is in the format of the talk
that was delivered, or at least as it was meant to be delivered.
1 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008) (finding that the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual right to bear arms).
2 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Chief Justice Taney’s discussion of the rights of citizens and the implications
of citizenship in Dred Scott; Chief Justice Waite’s examination of the
distinctions between federal restrictions and state and private action in
Cruikshank; Justice Wood’s refusal to apply the Second Amendment to state
action in Presser v. Illinois; and Justice McReynolds’s opinion in United States
v. Miller, which is best read as recognizing an individual’s right to have arms
while also reaffirming the by-then long recognized principle that some arms
are within the ambit of constitutional protection and others are not.3 The
individual nature of the right was a largely unquestioned principle in the
Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed as late as 1961 in Justice John Marshal Harlan
II’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, it was considered rather unremarkable.4
Still the Second Amendment would not receive definitive recognition,
including a recognition that it provided real limitations on firearms regulation,
until Heller, some 217 years after its initial adoption. This lack of judicial
engagement occurred for two reasons. The first reason is the intellectually
haphazard way the Court has gone about the business of incorporation or
applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is strong evidence that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended and understood that, by the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they were forever altering the old federalism in which the federal
Constitution had little or nothing to say concerning the rights of the citizen in
the face of state power.5 The post–Fourteenth Amendment Court early on
3 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
257 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876); Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
4 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
included in his dissent a discussion of the right to have arms as part of the group of rights
guaranteed to American citizens. He did so to advise his fellow Justices that the rights
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights do not exhaust the constitutionally protected
rights of Americans. Although he wrote for the dissent in Poe, a case involving the state of
Connecticut’s then-existing prohibition on the sale of contraceptives, his language would be
repeated in subsequent cases involving the right to privacy. What is important for our
purposes is that Justice Harlan felt completely comfortable simply listing the right to have
arms along with other enumerated rights without indicating any need to discuss the right to
have arms as being somehow confined to those who were members of the militia or
involved in militia service. Instead Harlan simply discussed the right as one of the rights
generally safeguarded to the American people at large:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in
or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This “liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and
bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable search and seizures; and so on.
Id.
5 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham) (stating that the Amendment would be “enforced everywhere” and “would arm
Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath [to obey the Constitution] and
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rejected the new constitutional order and in many ways, McDonald being but
the latest example,6 has spent nearly a century and a half trying to revive the
constitutional goal that Jonathan Bingham and Jacob Howard7 tried to advance
in 1866.8 In any event, much of the jurisprudence denying Second Amendment
claims alleging infringement of the right to keep and bear arms was rooted in
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the citizen from state
restrictions on the use of firearms.9 As most restrictions historically, and
indeed in the present, come from state legislatures and not Congress, that
limitation was of critical importance.
And there was, of course, another reason that the courts became increasingly
unwilling to apply the Second Amendment and seriously examine the extent to
which it posed limitations on firearms regulations. Particularly after the turmoil
of the 1960s and the growth of the modern gun control movement, which has
always had a strong prohibitionist contingent in its ranks, more and more
jurists had come to agree with former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe
Pound’s view that the Second Amendment was simply too dangerous to be
recognized in modern times.10 Many thought that it would be best, if the
Amendment could not be repealed outright, that the provision be subject to
judicial nullification.11 Lower federal courts increasingly engaged in such
nullification, using numerous variations of the idea that the Amendment only
protected the right of states to have militias, or only protected individuals who
were actively in militia service.12 The exact details of what was protected or

punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights”); see also Richard L. Aynes,
Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 77, 86 (2009) (“All seem to agree that Senator Jacob Howard’s speech in the
Senate indicated that one of the purposes of the Amendment was to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the states.”).
6 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020.
7 John Bingham and Jacob Howard were the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Aynes, supra note 5, at 140.
8 Wayne D. Moore, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Initial Authority: Problems of
Constitutional Coherence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 523 (2004) (explaining
how the Slaughter-House Cases and Civil Rights Cases can be viewed as efforts by the
Supreme Court to avoid interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as altering the past
constitutional order).
9 See Bethany Jones, Monkey See, Monkey Do? The Establishment Clause as Possibly
Illustrative of the Second Amendment’s Incorporation, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 509, 522 (2009)
(explaining that the Court’s refusal to examine the Second Amendment and its silence on
the issue indicated that the Second Amendment was not incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment). Because of this silence, most lower courts decided that the Second
Amendment was not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
10 Roscoe Pound, From the Revolution to the Constitution, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 82, 89-91 (1957).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because the Second
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how a right of the people became, in effect, a right of the states, or a right of a
government agency or government agency members, were somewhat hazy. But
the important thing, we were assured, was that no individual could contest an
arms infringement, however severe, on the grounds that the right to keep and
bear arms was imperiled. The lower federal courts’ judicial nullification of the
Second Amendment in the second half of the twentieth century is similar to the
federal judiciary’s treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection for the right to vote
regardless of race in the early decades of the twentieth century. In both
instances the federal judiciary effectively nullified an intended constitutional
protection for a civil right because it believed this was the better policy
choice.13
Let me fast forward a bit (for those of us who still have a VHS player
somewhere at home). What I just described was the past. Heller and McDonald
are our present reality. The Court has recognized an individual right by a bare
five-four majority. It is clear that some members of the Court not only
dissented from that result, but are eager to reverse it. Justice Ginsburg, for
example, has been particularly active in speaking out against the two Second
Amendment decisions. She recently articulated a remarkable version of the
collective rights theory, stating that the Second Amendment was put in the
Constitution in part because the infant American Republic could not afford an
army and had to rely on a broad-based militia for national defense.14 Now that
we can afford an army, and one might indeed add an Air Force, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard, as well, Justice Ginsburg argues that the Second
Amendment is obsolete and no longer protects the right to have arms.15 Justice
Ginsburg did not explain, however, why a nation that could not afford an army
and had to rely on a broad based militia for its survival had to be reminded, in

Amendment guarantees the right of the states to maintain armed militia, the states alone
stand in the position to show legal injury when this right is infringed.”); Love v. Pepersack,
47 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The Second Amendment does not apply to the states.”);
Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. 1987) (“[The Second Amendment]
protects a state’s right to raise and regulate a militia by prohibiting Congress from enacting
legislation that will interfere with that right. [It] says nothing that would prohibit a state
from restricting the use or possession of weapons . . . .”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d
916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (“Whatever rights in this respect the people may have depend upon
local legislation; the only function of the Second Amendment being to prevent the federal
government and the federal government only from infringing that right.”).
13 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2250 (2002)
(remarking that in the beginning of the twentieth century the Supreme Court had effectively
nullified the Equal Protection Clause).
14 Interview by John Hockenberry with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Sept. 16, 2013)
(transcript archived at http://perma.cc/SW5Q-26WT) (including Justice Ginsburg’s
explanation of the origins and purpose of the Second Amendment).
15 Id. (describing the Second Amendment as obsolete).
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a constitutional amendment, no less, not to disarm its only means of defense.
Nor did she explain why the right in the Second Amendment was termed a
“right of the people” when what she describes is a power of the government to
maintain a militia so long as it deemed one to be necessary.16
But in any event we have an individual right to keep and bear arms
recognized by the Supreme Court and now applied by the lower federal and
state courts. So how much of a constitutional impediment to gun control has
this new constitutional reality been to date?
The answer as a general matter is not very much. Courts appear to be
applying, at most, a somewhat weak intermediate scrutiny, perhaps even a
rational basis plus standard, to firearms restrictions, except in cases of outright
prohibitions, such as the circumstances that gave rise to Heller and McDonald.
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller, with its discussion of the
constitutionality of restrictions on carrying arms in sensitive places, certainly
suggests that the Second Amendment protects a right to bear as well as a right
to keep, the lower federal courts have not analyzed prohibitions or severe
restrictions on the right to carry with particularly rigorous scrutiny.17 The
notable exception is Judge Posner’s opinion in Moore v. Madigan,18 where the
Seventh Circuit voided Illinois’ total prohibition on the carrying of handguns.19
The Second Circuit has upheld financially prohibitive licensing fees and
extensive waiting periods, known to last as long as six months, for a license to

16

Id.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (finding that the Second
Amendment confers an “individual right to possess and carry weapons” (emphasis added));
see, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (ruling that the
New York statute that prevented individuals from obtaining full-carry licenses did not
violate the Second Amendment); People v. Ellison, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 245, 250 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011) (holding that California’s law prohibiting carrying concealed weapons did not
violate the Second Amendment); In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2013) (finding the New Jersey statute requiring a “justifiable need” to carry a weapon
did not violate the Second Amendment).
18 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
19 Id. at 933 (deciding that an Illinois statute that prohibited the carrying of guns in public
was unconstitutional). As this Essay was in the final editing stages, a three judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on February 13, 2014 held that the Second Amendment
included the right to carry an operable handgun outside the home for the purposes of selfdefense and that San Diego County’s requirement that a person had to show sufficiently
pressing need for self-defense before a permit to be carried would be issued infringed the
Second Amendment right to bear arms. It was not clear at the time this Essay went to press
whether there would be on en banc reconsideration of the ruling. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San
Diego, No. 10-56971, 2014 WL 555862 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014). On February 27, 2014 the
State of California filed a Motion to Intervene asking the Ninth Circuit to allow the state to
file for an en banc hearing because the Sheriff of San Diego County had declined to do so.
Motion to Intervene for Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Peruta, No. 1056971, 2014 WL 555862.
17

842

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:837

own a handgun in the home in New York City.20 The Fourth Circuit has found
reasonable Maryland’s system of granting permits to carry firearms that leaves
the issuance of such firearms solely to the discretion of police officials.21 No
federal court has seriously looked at restrictions on so-called assault weapons
in light of Heller and McDonald to ascertain if these weapons should be
required to satisfy some sort of special dangerousness test, which would
presumably be necessary for a prohibition on a weapon in light of a right to
bear arms. Nor have the courts seriously examined the extent to which such
weapons might be protected in light of a residual militia reading of the Second
Amendment, even though Heller, unlike its predecessor Miller, placed
individual self-defense, and not the idea of the broad-based citizen’s militia, at
the core of the protection afforded by the Second Amendment.
So at least to date the judicially recognized version of the Second
Amendment stands for the proposition that local, state, or federal governments
cannot have a total prohibition on all – or perhaps the most commonly owned –
rifles, pistols, and shotguns without a more detailed elaboration of which
specific weapons might be included in the protected categories. Also left
largely unresolved is whether or not the Second Amendment right includes a
right to carry arms for protection. I should make a slight detour here. So far I
have been speaking of the Second Amendment as a vehicle for judicial
protection for the right to arms. It should be acknowledged that the Second
Amendment has long served as something of a political and moral check on
firearms prohibition on the part of the political branches of government. At
least forty-four states have provisions in their constitutions protecting the right
to keep and bear arms.22 Twenty-one of these provisions were enacted or reenacted in the twentieth century.23 Congress’s repeated support for the
principle that the Constitution protects an individual’s right to arms is shown,
most recently, in the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 which, among
other things, provides federal protection from state action for firearms owners
traveling through states with restrictive firearms legislation.24 Public opinion
continued to support an individualistic reading of the Second Amendment even

20 Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding New York’s
licensing fees to be constitutional).
21 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 881 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the Maryland
statute requiring a “good and substantial reason” in order to obtain a gun license was
constitutional).
22 Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 191, 192 (2006) (asserting that forty-four states have constitutions with the right to
bear arms).
23 Id. at 192-205 (listing each state’s constitution provision about the right to bear arms
and the dates of enactment or re-enactment).
24 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 107(a), 100 Stat. 449,
460 (stating that any person who is permitted to own a firearm should be entitled to
transport the unloaded firearm in interstate commerce regardless of the state’s firearm laws).
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in the 1970s and 80s, when the judiciary was most beguiled by the militia-only
alternative.25
But the judiciary now recognizes the individual rights view of the
Amendment, and provides a protection for the citizen’s right to have arms,
even if that protection is quite modest. The modern gun control movement in
its salad days envisioned a regime of severe restrictions on firearms
ownership.26 There were efforts at handgun prohibition enacted in the District
of Columbia,27 Chicago, and a few other villages in Illinois,28 but these failed
more broadly even in a referendum in the 1970s in liberal Massachusetts.29 The
movement also sought strict limits on the ownership of rifles and shotguns. But
ordinary, commonly owned rifles, pistols, and shotguns (still largely
undefined) are now recognized as constitutionally protected. The judiciary is
now prepared to say that the Constitution prohibits that which the gun control
movement has, with the exception of a few outlier precincts, been politically
unable to achieve over the last forty years.
So where is the constitutional dysfunction? Why is there a calling forth of
the volunteer brigade of academic commentators to put out a constitutional fire
of exceedingly small dimensions?
I suspect one can only look at the Second Amendment as an example of
constitutional dysfunction if one accepts the fundamental postdates of the
modern gun control movement as it emerged since the late 1960s. Briefly
stated, the United States is a disturbing outlier among modern industrial
nations because of widespread ownership of guns, particularly for selfdefense.30 Even more disturbing, at least for some, many of these weapons
were and are of military vintage, although not quite the weapons currently used
by the Armed Forces. Their presence hints at a preparation for perhaps a war of
all against all, or of some against the government. Preparation for armed selfdefense, perhaps for insurrection itself, is disturbing. What happened to the

25

JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 138-39 (1983).
26 GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 11-14 (1997).
27 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008) (describing the District of
Columbia’s law prohibiting the possession of handguns).
28
McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the laws of
Chicago, Illinois and Oak Park, Illinois, both of which prohibited the possession of
handguns, violated the Second Amendment).
29 Robert J. Cahall, Local Gun Control Laws After District of Columbia v. Heller: Silver
Bullets or Shooting Blanks? The Case for Strong State Preemption of Local Gun Control
Laws, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 387 n.95 (2010) (noting that a Massachusetts
Handgun Ban Referendum was defeated in 1976).
30 See Joe Van Brussel, U.S. Guns: Statistics Show America an Outlier Among
Developed
Countries,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
20,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/20/us-guns-statistics-outlier_n_2331892.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/HT4K-MVU8.
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wise counsel we heard in political science class in our distant undergraduate
incarnations that the state should have a monopoly of force?31 Are we a
civilized society? What will we say to our European colleagues at international
conferences?
And there is the quite realistic fear of crime and the fear that widespread
availability of firearms has contributed to a high homicide rate in the United
States, one that is higher than the rates in what are generally considered
comparable countries, such as the nations of Western Europe, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.32 The Second Amendment is an example of
constitutional dysfunction even if it contributes only minimally to preventing
serious restrictions on firearms. Proponents of severe restrictions on firearms
ownership root their advocacy in part on the belief that strong restrictions on
firearms ownership are likely to bring significant reductions in violent crime,
particularly homicide, and that these reductions far outweigh any good that
might come from individual gun ownership. For example, gun control
proponents often assert that ordinary citizens are unable and unlikely to defend
themselves successfully with firearms and are more likely to do harm to
themselves and other innocent parties than to defend themselves effectively.33
These criminological premises, once the conventional wisdom in the
firearms debate, have not stood up very well in the face of serious social
science examination. For at least the first two decades of the national firearms
debate, in the 1960s and 1970s, the American public was solemnly assured that
decent, peaceable citizens possessing guns for self-defense were disasters
waiting to happen. “A gun in the home is more likely to kill a member of the
family than to defend against an intruder,” we were informed.34 “Allowing
citizens to carry firearms outside the home for self-protection will turn our
streets into Dodge City and our parking lots into the O.K. Corral” was the
frequent refrain.35 And then something happened. Starting in the 1980s, social
scientists, many who were previously neutral, and in some cases hostile, to

31

Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military
Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 896 n.43 (2004) (discussing the famous
phrase “monopoly of force,” coined by pioneering social scientist Max Weber).
32 Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership by Country, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nation/gun-homicides-ownership/table
(comparing the number of homicides in various countries throughout the world and finding
that, among developed countries, the United States has the greatest number of guns and the
highest per capita rate of firearm-related murders).
33 Warren E. Leary, Guns in the Home; Staying Unarmed Is Safer, a New Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, § 4, at 2 (discussing a study conducted by Arthur Kellerman at
Emory University, which concluded that having a gun in the home makes the homeowner
less safe rather than more safe).
34 Robert J. Cottrol, A Liberal Democrat’s Lament: Gun Control Is Racist, Sexist, and
Classist, AM. ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1999, at 58, 59.
35 Id.
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widespread public ownership of firearms began to put the claims of the gun
control movement under an empirical lens.36 Their findings did not bring great
comfort to advocates of stricter gun control. Rather their findings taken
together indicated a significant, although still to be debated, amount of selfdefense by ordinary U.S. citizens with privately owned weapons.37 Evidence
indicates that criminals’ fear of encountering armed victims plays a major role
in deterring crime, particularly violent crime, and that there is relatively little
misuse of firearms on the part of people who do not have criminal records or
histories of mental instability.38
I realize there are respected social scientists on both sides of the empirical
debate and that space and my own training and disciplinary limitations do not
permit me to review exhaustively the argument measuring each chi square and
r-square test offered by the different economists, sociologists, and statisticians
who have weighed in on this controversy. But the very existence of this
controversy, the fact that the criminological benefits of radical gun control are
far from proven, and indeed are highly contested, should cause us to approach
the notion of restrictive firearms policies – and the corollary idea that the
Second Amendment is some sort of constitutional infirmity that must be
overcome – with all due humility and skepticism. If the criminological benefits
and resulting crime reduction were uncontested and widely agreed upon, then
perhaps (and I emphasize only perhaps) the case for a radical reduction in
private firearm ownership and the need for the explicit or implicit repeal of the
Second Amendment might be something on which we could all agree. But with
the empirical case for radical gun control problematic at best, we need to ask
serious questions, not only concerning promised gains, but also concerning
losses that may come with a regime of radical gun control.
In terms of assessing the cost of such measures, it should first be noted that
firearms prohibition would require bringing the heavy hand of the criminal
justice system to bear on essentially peaceable citizens. Many of these citizens
would be made criminals, not because they set about the business of trying to
injure their fellow citizens, to commit robbery, rape, murder, or mayhem, but
because they seek to protect themselves from those who seek such ends. The
natural desire to find a means of protection would be strong, particularly in
some of the nation’s more violent precincts where the law has often
egregiously failed in its primary duty to protect people. Some would seek and
find weapons for protection, regardless of the state of the law. The promise that
rigorous gun restrictions will, in a generation or so, eliminate the estimated 300

36 Sociologist James D. Wright and his associates undertook one of the earliest of these
empirical studies. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25.
37 Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995-1996) (asserting
that there are 2.2 to 2.5 million civilian defensive gun uses on others each year, with 1.5 to
1.9 million of these incidents involving a handgun).
38 GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 130-45 (1991).
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million firearms in private hands,39 leading to a safer society for all, would be
of little comfort to those who live on the mean streets of some of our more
dangerous inner city neighborhoods. Many in those neighborhoods find that
the law’s current promise for protection is a hollow one, and that the promise
of a gun free, safer future is more social science fiction than achievable reality.
Restrictions would have to be enforced with great rigor, a rigor that might
very well punish more severely those who commit the malum prohibitum
crime of possessing defensive weapons than those who commit what we
traditionally viewed as a malum in se crime – such as burglary, robbery, rape,
or assault and battery – which is inherently evil regardless of the particular
jurisdiction or historical moment in which we happen to find ourselves. I recall
two such examples right here in Massachusetts from when I first began
teaching law at Boston College in the 1980s. One case involved a man named
Sylvester Lindsey who was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license.40
Lindsey carried a pistol to protect himself from a coworker who had threatened
and attacked him, and used the pistol to shoot his coworker in self-defense.
Lindsey was found not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder, but was
convicted of illegally carrying a pistol in violation of Massachusetts’s FoxBartley statute.41 In reviewing his sentence of one year imprisonment, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed that, though Lindsey’s
possession of the pistol may very well have saved his life, the Massachusetts
statute gave the court no discretion.42 The statute mandated a year in prison for
the unlicensed carrying of a pistol, regardless of the defendant’s needs, and
regardless of the consequences of going unarmed in emergency
circumstances.43
Three years later in 1989, the Boston Globe reported that a trial court gave a
suspended sentence to a forty-four-year-old man who had twice committed
sexual assault on an eight-year-old girl.44 Taking the most charitable possible
view of the trial court judge’s actions in the latter case, an admittedly hard
task, we still had a monstrous state of legal affairs in Massachusetts in the late
1980s. A man who twice sexually assaults a child could have his excuses and
circumstances weighed and given leniency, while a man who defends himself,

39

See L. Hepburn et al., The US Gun Stock: Results from the 2004 National Firearms
Survey, 13 INJ. PREVENTION 15, 18, 19 (2007), available at http://
injuryprevention.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/13/1/15.
40 See Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 489 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1986).
41 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (1975).
42 Lindsey, 489 N.E.2d at 669 (explaining that before the one-year mandatory minimum
sentence for gun possession was imposed, the Court would have had more discretion, but
now an option to lower the sentence was not available).
43 Id.
44 Richard Kindleberger, Ruling in Beverly Assault Case Leaves Scars, BOS. GLOBE,
Mar. 26, 1989, at 25 (explaining that a sexual assault convict is released with probation,
instead of jail time).
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and perhaps saves his life, with an illegal gun could be sent to prison. No
explanations, excuses, or mitigations can be allowed to modify the law’s rigor.
Before we embark on a course of far-reaching gun control, we need to ask hard
questions about the extent to which such an approach will perforce create more
cases like Sylvester Lindsey’s, cases that result in harsh and disproportionate
punishment for people who can only be deterred with draconian penalties far
out of proportion to either the threat they pose to society or the inherent evil of
the offense they have committed. They can only be so deterred because they
rightly perceive that the alternative to being armed is to be at the mercy of the
predators from whom the state has failed to protect them. Surely before we
embark on such a course, we should be sure that the criminological gain is
worth the moral cost.
But for some advocates of severely restrictive gun control, the virtue in such
measures and in doing away with the Second Amendment lies not in a
weighing of the criminological costs and benefits. Instead the new direction is
desirable because it would signal an improvement in the nation’s culture, a
promising sign that we had joined the rest of the world’s advanced nations in
giving the state a monopoly of force. We are informed that such a monopoly
will take us away from our atavistic past of frontier violence and racial conflict
into the bright dawn of civilized nations, where disputes are peacefully
resolved and conflicts settled by a benevolent and powerful state.
And yet it is this international comparison, more than perhaps any other
consideration, that should give us serious pause concerning the prescriptions
proffered by those who advocate the radical disarmament of the American
public. The twentieth century repeatedly gave us horrifying examples of the
consequences of unchecked state monopolies of force. University of Hawaii
political scientist Rudolph J. Rummel, one of the leading students of democide
– the mass murder of civilian populations by governments – estimated that
nearly 170 million people were murdered by their own governments in the
twentieth century.45 The familiar list of mass murderers – Hitler, Stalin Mao,
and Pol Pot – only scratches the surface of the monsters who have gained
control of national governments and have wrecked havoc on victims by the
millions.46 Before we accept the notion that the state should have this
monopoly of force, we need to ask ourselves some hard questions. Could the
overstretched Nazi war machine have murdered between ten- and twenty-
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million armed and resisting Europeans while also taking on the Soviet and
Anglo-American armies?47 Could fifty- to seventy-thousand Khmer Rouge
have butchered two- to three-million armed Cambodians?48 And perhaps most
disturbing of all, why do we not ask these questions regularly and integrate
them into our national debate on gun ownership?49
At one time our national leaders, including our liberal national leaders,
recognized that the uniqueness of the American right to keep and bear arms
was not something for which to apologize, but instead a feature of American
governance from which the rest of the world might learn. Hubert Humphrey
was one such national leader, who remarked:
Certainly one of the chief guarantees of freedom under any government,
no matter how popular and respected, is the right of citizens to keep and
bear arms. This is not to say that firearms should not be very carefully
used and that definite safety rules of precaution should not be taught and
enforced. But the right of citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee
against arbitrary government, one more safeguard against a tyranny which
now appears remote in America, but which has historically proved to be
always possible.50
And yet I fear that in more recent decades this critical question of whether
or not the state should be granted a monopoly of force has been relegated to the
margins of our national discourse on this critical topic.
There is of course an argument that a population equipped with small arms
would be unable to resist effectively a modern military force, with its array of
armored vehicles, long-range artillery, and attack aircraft.51 While I am not
totally persuaded by that argument, it is one that must give some pause to those
of us who support an armed civilian population in part to resist or help resist a
potentially tyrannical government. But perhaps that question should be framed
less in terms of the kind of resistance that would result in the overthrow of a
potentially despotic government, and more in terms of a resistance that raises
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the costs and consequently provides some deterrence against some of the worst
acts that totalitarian governments are capable of committing. Perhaps we
should pay more attention to one of the victims of Stalin, one of the more
prolific of the monsters in human form, who slaughtered millions in the
twentieth century. Writer Alexandr Solzhenitsyn’s words still speak for the
tens of millions who perished in the concentration camps of Central and
Eastern Europe, the gulags of the Soviet Union, and the killing fields of
Cambodia:
And how we burned in the camps later, thinking: What would things have
been like if every Security operative, when he went out at night to make
an arrest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive and had to say
good-bye to his family? Or if, during periods of mass arrests, as for
example in Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the entire city,
people had not simply sat there in their lairs, paling with terror at every
bang of the downstairs door and at every step on the staircase, but had
understood they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in the
downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people with axes, hammers,
pokers or whatever else was at hand? . . . The Organs would very quickly
have suffered a shortage of officers and transport and, notwithstanding all
of Stalin’s thirst, the cursed machine would have ground to a halt!52
Some would argue that such considerations are out of place in contemporary
America, with its strong democratic traditions and open access to the
legislatures and the courts, and that talk of an insurrectionist dimension to the
Constitution is dangerous and in itself undemocratic. And yet as Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, himself the son of Holocaust survivors, reminds
us, “few saw the Third Reich coming until it was too late.”53 Can we say that
such a discussion must not be entertained, that we regard ourselves as forever
immune from the kinds of evil forces that have befallen other nations? I
certainly hope so, but should we be willing to render ourselves helpless in the
belief that such can never happen here?
We should approach the notion that it cannot happen here with due humility.
The United States has been spared the reign of mad dictators bent on
52
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subjugating, terrorizing, and destroying whole populations. But state tyranny
can come in other forms, including the deliberate refusal of authorities to
protect unpopular groups from violence by hostile majorities. A number of
scholars, myself included, have written about this from the perspective of the
Afro-American experience, and how a right to arms played an important role in
mitigating racial violence during the Jim Crow era and in providing the
physical protection that enabled the voter registration efforts and other
activities of civil rights workers in the South in the 1950s and 1960s.54 These
examples should not be disregarded as simply historical examples from a past
that is now mercifully, or hopefully, far behind us. Instead they should be seen
as case studies in the need for vulnerable minorities to have the means of selfdefense. The names of the minorities who might have such needs will change
over time, but the principle that there is a need for the means of self-defense,
that it should not be taken away, and that it is dangerous to force a people to
rely solely on the state for protection, remains sound policy, and not an
example of constitutional dysfunction.
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